We examine how a firm's formal organizational structure affects its ability to cope with interdependent decisions. An agent-based simulation, in which firms struggle to discover good sets of decisions, allows us to examine four coordinating mechanisms that have rarely been analyzed jointly: the grouping of related decisions under a single subordinate, a vertical hierarchy that reviews proposals from subordinates, firm-level incentives, and managers who are able to process more information. We find that organizational structure affects long-term performance by influencing the number and nature of "sticking points"-configurations of choices the organization will not change. We identify each of the four coordinating mechanisms as a force that either encourages firms to explore a broad set of alternatives or stabilizes firms around existing choices. Successful firms strike a balance between exploration and stability. The need to balance exploration and stability generates interdependencies among the coordinating mechanisms. As a result, firms sometimes benefit from seemingly harmful features: avoidable decision interdependence between departments, a passive CEO, or subordinates of limited ability. We further examine how appropriate organizational design depends on the underlying pattern of interaction among decisions. When interactions are pervasive, successful organizations employ coordinating mechanisms that promote broad exploration.
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Introduction
In firms of even modest size, interdependent decisions are allocated to distinct managers. One manager is given the right and responsibility to make production decisions, for instance, while another makes marketing choices-despite the fact that production and marketing decisions affect one another.
One manager controls one product line while a second manager controls another, even though the two product lines may share a factory or a sales force. Formal organizational design is, at its essence, a process of breaking interdependent decisions into bundles commonly known as jobs, assigning individuals to those jobs, and arranging some means to coordinate individual action.
Students of organizational design have considered a number of mechanisms that promote coordination across interdependent decisions (Galbraith 1973; Mintzberg 1979; Nadler and Tushman 1997) . In this paper, we develop a model that permits us to explore the workings of, and the relationships among, four especially prominent elements of formal organizational design.
1. Decomposition is the grouping of decisions so that, as far as possible, related decisions are under the purview of a single manager. A common example would be the creation of a separate division for a particular product line within a diversified corporation. The general manager of the division would, within the limits of her ability, coordinate the highly related manufacturing, distribution, marketing, sales, and service decisions associated with the product.
2. The vertical hierarchy connects the decomposed parts and deals with interactions that remain after decomposition. A vertical hierarchy might consist, for instance, of a CEO who sits above distinct product divisions, reviewing and integrating their decisions.
3. Firm-level incentives encourage managers to act for the good of the overall organization rather than pursue the parochial interests of their divisions or departments. If one cannot decompose the organization's tasks completely or ensure coordination by means of hierarchy, perhaps one can persuade division managers to align their choices by giving them proper, broad incentives.
4. Finally, we examine the role of managerial ability. Interdependent managerial tasks must be divided into jobs in part because individual managers are limited in their ability to process information and consider alternatives. A natural approach to improve coordination, then, is to hire smarter managers.
These four are not an exhaustive list of the coordinating mechanisms that organizational designers have considered and employed. However, as we discuss in Section 2, they do cover the important classes of mechanisms in the literature on formal organizational architecture. Section 2 also highlights the backdrop against which the coordinating mechanisms operate: the underlying pattern of interactions among decisions.
We model these coordinating mechanisms and the underlying pattern of interaction using an agentbased simulation model derived from research on complex adaptive systems (Section 3). This approach enables us to look simultaneously at all four coordinating mechanisms, distinguishing our work from prior papers that have examined only one or two mechanisms at a time. Our effort joins a growing set of agent-based simulations of human organizations (e.g., Carley and Lin 1997; Levinthal 1997; Chang and Harrington 2000) . In our model, firms with different organizational features face a long series of decision problems. For each decision problem, each firm attempts to find a good solution, that is, an effective set of choices. Decisions within each decision problem interact with one another in a manner controlled by the modeler. The management team of each firm consists of a very simple hierarchy: a CEO and two subordinate managers. Each subordinate manager has purview over a subset of the organization's decisions, a "department." Starting from a particular configuration of choices, each manager considers altering the decisions under his command, evaluates the alternatives in light of an incentive system, and makes recommendations to the CEO. The CEO reviews the proposals and accepts the pair of proposalsone from each manager-that will serve the firm best. In choosing the best pair of choices, she has the prerogative to overrule either or both of her subordinates and maintain the status quo.
Modeled firms differ in their structures: how they allocate decisions to subordinates; how active a role the CEO takes; how much information managers convey up the vertical hierarchy; and whether managers are rewarded for departmental success or the performance of the firm as a whole. Organizations also differ in the cognitive abilities of their CEOs and managers. By comparing the performance levels of firms with different structures across a large number of decision problems, we can isolate how the distinct coordinating mechanisms affect the ability of a firm to cope with interrelated decisions.
The results of our modeling effort (Section 4) focus on interdependencies in two senses. First, we show that the underlying pattern of interaction among decisions has a profound effect on the efficacy of these coordinating mechanisms. Second, we find that the mechanisms interact with one another in ways that are surprising at first but have reasonable explanations. We observe, for instance, a) when the interactions among decisions span departmental borders, hiring smarter subordinates may undermine firm performance; b) when a firm has a capable CEO, it may be beneficial to intentionally leave interdependencies between departments; c) given certain patterns of interaction among decisions and low levels of managerial ability, it may be better to have a CEO who blindly rubberstamps the proposals of subordinates than to have one who actively exercises discretion. Such interdependencies among coordinating mechanisms are consistent with a longstanding observation in the literature on organizational design, that the fit among elements of an organization's architecture is as important for success as the disposition of any individual element (Mintzberg 1979: 216-220) .
We interpret our results (Section 5) in terms of a firm's search in a space of possibilities, using the landscape conceptualization that has become popular in certain formal models of organizational search (Kauffman 1995; Levinthal 1997; Levinthal and Warglien 1999; Gavetti and Levinthal 2000; Ghemawat and Levinthal 2000; Rivkin 2000; Fleming and Sorenson forthcoming) . A mapping from firm decisions to payoffs creates a landscape in the space of decisions. Firms can be conceived of as trying to attain and sustain a high spot on such a landscape-a combination of decisions that, together, yield a high payoff.
When decisions interact richly, such landscapes become rugged with numerous local peaks. From a local peak, no single decision can be changed in a way that improves the firm's payoff.
Organizational design, we argue, affects firm performance by altering firms' search behavior on the landscapes they face. A firm typically gravitates on its landscape toward a "sticking point"-a configuration of choices from which it will not change. Importantly, sticking points may or may not be local peaks; there exist local peaks that are not sticking points and sticking points that are not local peaks.
Organizational design affects long-term performance by two primary channels. First, it alters the nature of a firm's sticking points-the number of such points and the payoffs associated with them. Second, it influences the likelihood that a firm will actually reach such a stable configuration of choices.
In our simulations, organizations with the most effective designs balance exploration and exploitation (March 1991) . Early on they are able to explore their landscapes broadly. Having found a good set of decisions, they are able to stabilize around that set rather than wander incessantly. In landscape terms, 4 they find good points and also stick to those points. We find that specific organizational characteristics are associated with exploration and stability. Roughly speaking, firms with interdependencies between departments, decentralized decision-making, department-based incentives, and smart subordinates tend to explore broadly. Firms with completely decomposed decisions, strong vertical hierarchies, firm-level incentives, and departmental managers of modest abilities tend to be good exploiters; they stabilize around sets of decisions rather than wander. These tendencies create interdependencies among elements of organizational design. Often a firm must offset one element's push toward exploration with another's pull toward stability. Prior models of organizational search tend to overlook such interdependencies because they often grant "stability for free": that is, they assume that firms which discover good decisions through exploration can lock-in on those decisions forever. Contrary to this assumption, we illustrate that organizational structures which enable discovery may undermine lock-in.
Formal Design for Coordination
A rich heritage of qualitative studies concerning organizational design identifies five features that a thorough, formal model of design would encompass: underlying patterns of interactions among decisions, limits on managerial ability, grouping of decisions, structural links across groups, and coordinating systems and processes. Most formal models of organizational design, however, have focused on only one or two of the relevant features. We consider qualitative studies and formal modeling efforts in turn.
Qualitative studies. The qualitative literature on organizational design is extensive and diverse, encompassing grounded theoretical work, field studies, and numerous syntheses (Mintzberg (1979) , Gibson et al. (2000) ). Despite its diversity, the literature is unified in what it perceives as the central challenge of organizational design: to divide the tasks of a firm into manageable, specialized jobs, yet coordinate the tasks so that the firm reaps the benefits of harmonious action. Implicit in this challenge are two important assumptions. First, coordination is valuable because the tasks of the firm, and the decisions associated with the tasks, interact with one another; that is, a decision made concerning one task affects the efficacy of performing another task one way or another. Without such interactions, coordination would be unnecessary. Accordingly, the literature on organizational design has repeatedly returned to the underlying pattern of interaction, or interdependence, among a firm's tasks (Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1973; Mintzberg 1979, especially Ch. 7; Nadler and Tushman 1997) . We consider this the first element that a model of organizational design should encompass. The second assumption is that the firm's situation creates a demand for information processing that exceeds the deliberative capacity of any individual manager (Simon 1957) . If this were not so, a single über-manager could evaluate all of a firm's alternatives and dictate the best, coordinated course of action. Hence a model of organizational design should incorporate, as a second critical element, limits on managerial ability.
How can an organization in which the complexity of decision problems exceeds the cognitive capacity of any single decision maker achieve coordinated action? Below, we focus on the major coordinating mechanisms that are part of a firm's formal organizational design: grouping, structural linking, and systems and processes (Nadler and Tushman 1997) . Grouping. Most treatises on organizational design consider grouping, i.e., "the aggregation of work functions, positions, and individuals into work groups" (Nadler and Tushman 1997: 67) , to be "a fundamental means to coordinate work in the organization" (Mintzberg 1979: 106) . Theoretical analyses generally emphasize how interdependencies among tasks influence the way in which decisions should be grouped. Thompson (1967) , for instance, argues that tasks should be grouped so that the most intensive interactions are internalized. Thus, groups should be formed so that, as nearly as possible, the firm is decomposed (Simon 1962) into independent entities. In the words of Simon (1973: 270) , "Any division of labor among decisional subsystems creates externalities, which arise out of the interdependence among the subsystems that are ignored. What is wanted is a factorization that minimizes these externalities."
1 We focus on formal mechanisms not because informal mechanisms, such as informal communication systems (Mintzberg 1979) or corporate culture (Camerer and Vepsalainen 1988; Nadler and Tushman 1997) are unimportant in achieving coordination, but rather for other reasons. The formal mechanisms alone are more than sufficient to fuel a complex analysis, as the rest of the paper shows. Moreover, the formal mechanisms can be modeled more precisely than the informal mechanisms. Precise modeling of each individual mechanism is especially important if one wants, as we do, to examine the interdependencies among them. That said, we consider the analysis of informal means to achieve coordination an important topic for future research.
The prominence of grouping in the qualitative literature on organizational design suggests that a thorough model of design must include, as a third element, some notion of decomposition. That is, modeled firms must be able to try to achieve coordination by assigning decision rights in a way that places related decisions under a single manager.
Structural linking. "Structural links," i.e., formal connections across groups, are another important coordinating mechanism. A CEO, for instance, may sit above a set of department heads, review the proposals of the departments, and try to integrate them in a way that achieves coordination. Because it exists in virtually every organization, we focus our modeling effort below on the vertical hierarchy. We ignore lateral linkages such as liaison positions and matrix structures (Galbraith 1973) for the sake of parsimony, not because they are unimportant in practice.
Systems and processes. Coordination can also be enhanced by systems and processes that span group borders. Designed well, such systems and processes can make managers aware of and responsive to what happens beyond their own domains. Nadler and Tushman (1997) identify a rich variety of coordinating systems and processes: strategic planning efforts, resource allocation programs, information management systems, processes that cut across traditional group borders, and so forth. Among these, we choose as our fifth modeling element the incentive system, the system that arguably has received the greatest attention.
Our review of the qualitative literature omits one, important element that an ideal model might incorporate: environmental change. A distinguished line of research shows that an organization's architecture should be contingent on the nature of the external turbulence it faces (Burns and Stalker 1961; Chandler 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) . In an environment characterized by rapid change, for instance, an organic structure that adapts easily may be more appropriate than a mechanistic structure with rigid-though efficient-procedures and arrangements. In related work, we are using an extension of the model described below to analyze such contingency arguments.
Formal modeling efforts. Formal modeling of organizational design has burgeoned in the past decade as economists have sought to pry open the "black box" of the firm. Due to space constraints, we restrict ourselves to outlining four patterns in the set of prior models. (A full discussion is available from the authors.) First, the largest body of work focuses on the shape of the optimal hierarchy-the number of tiers in the hierarchy, the span of control, and the relationship between tiers (e.g. Williamson 1967; Bolton and Dewatripont 1994; Garicano 2000) . A second important strand of the modeling literature examines the relationship between the vertical hierarchy and incentives. Models show, for example, that when senior managers overrule proposals of subordinates, they increase their ability to implement preferred actions, but decrease the incentives of subordinates to exert effort and come up with good proposals (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999) . Consistently, formal models focus on the strength of incentives-that is, the degree to which managers are paid on the basis of performance. Existing models, thus, tend to emphasize incentives as a means to evoke effort, not as a way to promote coordination.
The third pattern we see among prior modeling efforts is that interactions, decomposition, and explicit limits on managerial ability have received less attention than hierarchy and incentives. In many models, interactions are explicitly suppressed, and the managerial task is to process a number of independent information items (e.g., Radner 1993) . Only a few studies consider the relationship between interactions and task grouping (e.g., Crémer 1980; Harris and Raviv 2000; Hart and Moore 1999; Rotemberg 1999 ).
Finally, we note that virtually all prior models emphasize only one or two of the key features we identified in the qualitative literature. Such focus permits modelers to examine individual features in admirable depth and to develop models with closed-form analytical solutions. However, this focus limits the ability to understand crucial relationships among the features.
A Model of Organizational Design and Search
Our goal is to examine how a firm's organizational structure affects its ability to cope with sets of interdependent decisions. To do so, we develop a simulation model in which the modeler dictates the underlying pattern of interaction among decisions; a computer generates a set of particular decision problems that follow that pattern; and large numbers of modeled firms with different organizational characteristics tackle these decision problems. In crafting the model, we intentionally place less emphasis on the aspects of organizational design that others have modeled well. For instance, we do not examine the optimal shape of the vertical hierarchy or the role of strong incentives in evoking effort. The organizational characteristics we model are the degree of decomposition, features of the vertical hierarchy, the degree of firm-level incentives, and the ability of managers.
A. Setting the Pattern of Interaction
The management team of each modeled firm must make N binary decisions about how to configure its activities. N reflects the fact that a real firm must make numerous decisions about its activities. It must choose, for instance, whether to have its own sales force or to sell through third parties, whether to field a broad product line or a narrow one, whether to pursue basic R&D or not, etc. An N-digit string of zeroes and ones summarizes all the decisions a firm makes that affect its performance. We represent this Figure 1 gives some examples of influence matrices for N = 6. The (i, j) th entry of I is marked by an "x" if column-decision j influences the contribution of row-decision i and is blank otherwise.
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In the simulations reported below, we set influence matrices in two ways. In many cases, we fully specify the matrix by hand (Ghemawat and Levinthal 2000) . We might, for instance, dictate a block-diagonal matrix of influences as shown in Figure 1C . With such a pattern of influence, one can compare, say, the performance of a firm that allocates decisions 1-3 to one subordinate and decisions 4-6 to the other to the performance of a firm that divides responsibility in some other way. In other simulations, we simply specify K, the number of decisions that influence each decision (Kauffman 1993) . The computer then randomly determines the identity of the K other decisions that affect each focal decision. With N = 6, K = 2, the influence matrix might appear as shown in Figure 1D . There, the contribution of each decision to firm performance is influenced by the resolution of that decision itself and the choices made concerning two randomly assigned other decisions. (Thus, each row contains two off-diagonal x's.)
More generally, K can range from 0 to N -1. K = 0 implies that decisions are independent. K = N -1 captures a situation in which each decision is influenced by all others. The parameter K allows us to tune the degree of interaction from full independence to complete interdependence without specifying particular patterns of influence narrowly.
B. Generating Decision Problems
Once the pattern of interaction is set, the computer generates a decision problem. That is, it assigns a distribution. The overall payoff associated with a configuration is the average over the N contributions:
This procedure for generating payoff functions-stochastically, but with well-controlled patterns of interaction-is adapted from Kauffman's (1993) NK model, a model originally developed in the context of evolutionary biology. Numerous management scholars have used the procedure in recent years to generate payoff functions that can be employed to examine organizational search (Levinthal 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal 2000; Ghemawat and Levinthal 2000; Rivkin 2000; Marengo, et al. 2000; McKelvey 1999 , and references therein). It is common to interpret such payoff functions in terms of high-dimensional landscapes. Each of the N decisions constitutes a "horizontal" axis in a highdimensional space, and each decision offers different options. Resulting from each combination of choices is a payoff for the firm, which is plotted on the vertical axis. The goal of organizational search is to find and occupy a high spot on this landscape, i.e., to select a combination of choices that, together, are highly successful. Interactions among decisions cause the landscape to become rugged and multi-peaked, making the search for a high peak profoundly more difficult (Kauffman 1993; Rivkin 2000) .
C. Searching the Landscapes
Having fixed a pattern of interaction, we use the procedure described above to generate manytypically one thousand-landscapes with the same underlying pattern of interaction. Onto each landscape (or equivalently, decision problem), we send a set of firms. Each firm in a set searches for a good configuration of choices. All firms in a particular set start with the same initial configuration of choices,
i.e., firms begin on equal footing. Firms in a set differ, however, in their organizational designs and the capabilities of their management teams. For instance, Firm 1 in a set might have highly capable subordinates while Firm 2 has subordinates of very limited ability. By comparing the behavior of Firms 1 and 2 across thousands of landscapes, we can isolate the effect of subordinate ability on performance.
Decomposition: allocation of decisions. Each firm has a management team consisting of a CEO,
subordinate Manager A, and subordinate Manager B. Manager A has primary responsibility for a subset of the N decisions, and Manager B has responsibility for the complementary subset. We use a string of a's and b's to designate a particular allocation of decisions. In a simulation with N = 6, e.g., the allocation abbbba would indicate that Manager A has responsibility for decisions 1 and 6 while Manager B controls decisions 2-5. We think of decisions 2-5 as constituting Manager B's department. The more that related decisions are assigned to a single manager-that is, the more often that x's in the influence matrix correspond to pairs of decisions under one manager-the better an allocation decomposes the decisions.
Subordinate capability. Search proceeds in a series of periods. In each period, each subordinate manager reconsiders the configuration of choices in his department. Specifically, he compares the status quo to some number, ALTSUB, alternatives. Continuing with the N = 6 example mentioned above, suppose that ALTSUB = 5 and the current configuration of firm choices is 100111. This means that the current configuration of choices in Manager B's department is 0011. He considers five local alternatives to 0011. These include all four of the adjacent alternatives (1011, 0111, 0001, and 0010) and one of the six alternatives that involve changing two decisions. (One of the six is chosen at random.) ALTSUB reflects the cognitive abilities of the subordinate manager. A manager with a higher level of ALTSUB is "smarter"-able to consider more alternatives and able to assess the ramifications of changing more choices within his department at once.
Incentives: assessment of alternatives. Each manager ranks the ALTSUB alternatives from most preferred to least. In assessing alternatives, he puts primary weight on the performance of his department, but he may also consider the effects of his changes beyond his domain. INCENT, a parameter that ranges from 0 to 1, captures the degree to which the subordinate cares about the ramifications of his actions on the other department. INCENT = 0 implies that each manager considers only effects within his department; this may reflect, for instance, a firm in which managers are paid strictly on the basis of local business unit profitability. INCENT = 1 implies that each manager is equally concerned with effects outside his department and genuinely wants to maximize firm-wide payoff; this may reflect a firm in which divisional officers are rewarded for overall corporate performance.
Suppose that INCENT = 0.4 in the N = 6 example. Then in assessing any alternative d, subordinate Manager B will consider
In evaluating alternatives, each subordinate assumes that choices in the other department will not change.
Note that we focus on the breadth of incentives (the degree to which departmental managers take into account firm-level ramifications), not the strength of incentives (the degree to which managers are paid on the basis of performance rather than a flat salary).
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Vertical hierarchy and the ability of the CEO. Each subordinate considers the ALTSUB alternatives and the status quo in his department and then sends up to the CEO the P proposals that he most prefers. A low level of P reflects a firm in which managers are expected to, or permitted to, narrow down options a great deal before turning to superiors. A high level of P reflects a firm in which senior managers want to review many alternatives themselves.
We consider two types of CEOs. The first type simply rubberstamps the subordinates' proposals; that is, she accepts Manager A's favorite proposal and Manager B's favorite without review. One can think of a firm with a rubberstamping CEO as equivalent to one with no CEO at all. The second type of CEO exercises discretion. From roughly P 2 combinations of proposals (P from Manager A * P from Manager B), she selects ALTCEO at random, assesses them in light of the interests of the firm as a whole, compares them to the status quo, and selects the option that yields the best payoff for the firm. 5 ALTCEO reflects the cognitive power of the CEO; a smarter CEO is able to process more alternatives per period.
In the N = 6 example with decision allocation abbbba and current choice configuration 100111, suppose that P = 2 and ALTCEO = 2. Manager B might send up for review the alternatives 1011 and 0010 for choices 2-5 while Manager A might propose 11 and 10 for decisions 1 and 6. From the possibilities, the CEO might select configurations 110110 and 100110 for comparison to the status quo 100111. Whichever of these three yields the highest payoff for the firm is selected and implemented.
The new configuration becomes the launching point for further search in the next period. Subordinates and CEOs, thus, differ in the type of knowledge they possess. Subordinate managers have local 4 Our formulation requires that managers know the total contribution of each department or, equivalent, the performance of the entire firm and the total contribution of one department. Experts in accounting and performance measurement have developed sophisticated techniques to isolate the contributions of individual divisions, product lines, and functional departments (e.g., Kaplan and Atkinson 1998) . These techniques may, of course, err in their measurements of contributions. In related work, we are exploring what happens when managers in firms with various organizational structures misperceive performance.
5 Each subordinate sends up P options, which may or may not include the departmental status quo. The CEO always considers the departmental status quo as an option, even if the subordinate does not submit it. Hence the CEO may have as many as (P + 1) 2 -1 new combinations at her disposal (if neither manager submits the status quo as one of his proposals) or as few as P 2 -1 (if both managers submit the status quo as one of their proposals).
knowledge that allows them to generate proposals for their departments. CEOs do not have local knowledge, but possess global knowledge that enables them to assess the full ramifications of departmental choices on overall firm performance.
In sum, firms differ in their organizational arrangements: the grouping of decisions into departments, the amount of information conveyed to senior management (P), the degree to which the CEO acts upon that information (rubberstamping vs. active), and the incentives that managers have to consider effects beyond their domains (INCENT). Firms also differ in the abilities of their subordinates (ALTSUB) and their CEOs (ALTCEO). Overall, the organization we envision resembles the one examined by Bower's (1970) classic study of the resource allocation process. Senior management lays out some basic structural elements of the firm: the allocation of decision rights and the incentive system, for instance. Subject to those "rules of the game" (Jensen, et al. 1999) , lower-level managers select and promote proposals that they find attractive. Senior management then exercises some discretion in selecting among, and integrating across, the proposals that "bubble up." 6
D. Sticking Points
Firms continue to search for many periods. In many (but not all) cases, firms reach "sticking points" after a number of periods. That is, they reach configurations of choices from which they do not move.
From a sticking point, there is no alternative configuration of the N choices within the search radius of the firm which meets the approval of enough actors within the firm that the alternative can be adopted.
ALTSUB influences how broad the search radius is. Organizational arrangements dictate the standards that an alternative set of N choices must meet in order to be accepted. For instance, when the CEO exercises discretion, one such standard is that the alternative must yield a higher payoff for the firm as a whole than the status quo achieves. The same standard does not apply when the CEO simply rubberstamps proposals and INCENT is low. Then an alternative that is in the interest of just one department may be implemented.
In conceptions of organizational search it is common to think of firms as getting stuck on "local peaks" (e.g., Alchian 1950; Levinthal 1997) . A local peak is a configuration of choices for which a change in any single choice leads to worse performance, even though simultaneous changes in several choices may improve performance. We emphasize that sticking points and local peaks are different concepts. A local peak may not be a sticking point. Suppose, for instance, that a firm with low INCENT and a rubberstamping CEO sits atop a local peak. It is quite possible that a subordinate will discover and implement a move that is beneficial for his department but detrimental for the firm, causing the firm to descend from the peak. Similarly, a sticking point need not be a local peak. Consider an example in which a firm is one decision away from a local peak but the change required to attain the peak is not in the interest of the manager who controls the relevant decision. In such an instance, the manager may never propose the needed change, and a firm may get stuck on the "hillside" below a peak.
Results
We conducted a comprehensive set of analyses involving each coordinating mechanismdecomposition, vertical hierarchy, incentives, and managerial ability-and all the interactions among them. A few themes recur in the results. First, certain configurations of mechanisms encourage firms to explore a broad array of options while others lead firms to stabilize around particular sets of decisions.
Second, firms that perform well typically balance exploration and stability. Third, an organizational design that promotes exploration is especially effective when underlying decisions interact with one another intensely. We focus our discussion on a subset of analyses (see Table 1 ) that illustrates these themes. The full set of results is available from the authors.
Often in this section, we report that one type of firm achieves a higher level of performance on average than another. In each instance, the difference in mean performance is statistically significant with p < 0.001, assuring that reported differences are not simply chance occurrences caused by the stochastic nature of the landscape generation. 7 We report firm performance as a portion of the highest performance attainable on the landscapes that were explored. By this metric, a type of firm that always reaches the global optimum displays a long-run performance of 1.00.
Robustness.
We have observed the qualitative patterns described in this section under a far broader range of parameter values than reported here, and we are happy to share our user-friendly simulation software with any researcher who wants to probe the robustness of particular results in depth. That said, our primary goal in this paper is not to prove the generality of any single, fine-grained result. Rather, we aim to illustrate particular ways in which the elements of organizational structure can relate to one another and to identify broad tendencies in those relationships across a wide range of results.
A. Decomposition
Benefits of decomposition in a simple setting. As discussed in Section 2, a consensus exists in the qualitative literature on organizational design that firms should, as much as possible, assign decisions that influence one another to the same manager. This manager is able to "internalize" the interactions among decisions and find the department's choice configuration that is best for the firm. Indeed, in our simplest simulations, we find that it is usually helpful to place related decisions under the purview of a single manager. We illustrate the effect of decomposition in a simple setup. Here, the role of the CEO is only to rubberstamp the proposals of subordinate managers. Each manager cares only about the performance of his department (i.e., INCENT = 0). In each period, each manager considers one local alternative to his current configuration of choices (ALTSUB = 1). We specify the influence matrix and keep it fixed throughout. In particular, firms face decision problems in which N = 6 and all interactions are among decisions 1-3 and decisions 4-6. Thus, the influence matrix is block-diagonal as shown in Figure 1C .
While the particular profit contributions change from run to run, this pattern of interaction stays the same.
7 Significance levels were computed using the Scheffé test (Scheffé 1959) to take into account that many pairwise tests were conducted at the same time.
Firms differ only in the manner in which decisions are allocated to subordinates. Specifically, we compare Firm A1 with decision allocation aaabbb, which completely decomposes the firm into two independent parts, to Firm A2 with aabbba, which leaves interdependencies between the departments.
The first two columns of Table 2 show the simulation results. As expected, a better decomposition of decisions leads to superior performance: Π(Firm A1) ≥ Π(Firm A2) in each period. The bottom of Table   2 sheds light on the causes of long-run differences in performance. On 21.8% of the landscapes, Firm A2 fails to come to a sticking point. Rather, it continues to alter its decisions even after 80 periods have passed. In such cases, the subordinate managers are "stuck in a loop." Manager A alters a decision in order to improve performance in his department. Because of the imperfect decomposition, this changes conditions in Department B. Manager B then changes his decisions, which undermines the improvement efforts of Manager A. This process can continue ad infinitum, contributing to poor average performance.
In contrast, Firm A1 always comes to a stable configuration of decisions. Decisions in one department do not alter conditions in the other so there is no danger of mutually disruptive "improvement."
The performance advantage of Firm A1 comes from more than its stability. The final two lines of Table 2 characterize Firms A1's and A2's sets of sticking points. Even though the firms face identical decision problems, they have sticking points with very different characteristics because decisions are allocated differently. For both firms, sticking points constitute Nash equilibria in the game played by the two subordinates, a truce between departments: neither wants to change its choices in light of the decisions made by the other. For Firm A2, with interdependent departments, such equilibria are rare since each manager's actions affect the other manager's landscape (hence the small number of sticking points). Moreover, these equilibria often represent compromises between the departments that are poor for the organization as a whole; each manager refuses to make changes that worsen performance in his department but might benefit the firm as a whole (hence the low average height). In contrast, for the completely decomposed Firm A1, a sticking point arises whenever Manager A makes a locally optimal set of choices for Department A and Manager B does the same for Department B. Because of the complete decomposition, managers do not affect each other. Hence, locally optimal choices for Manager A are independent of Manager B's choices, and vice versa. As a result, there is no danger of a manager withholding a change that would benefit the firm. All such benefits are internalized within the departments and therefore can be exploited. For this reason, Firm A1's sticking points are relatively high.
(Firm A1 may still not reach the global peak due to the limited ability of each manager.)
Hazards of decomposition with an active CEO. The discussion so far makes it sound as if it is unambiguously good to allocate related decisions to a single manager. Completely decomposed firms gravitate toward attractive, stable configurations of decisions. In contrast, incompletely decomposed firms wander forever or reach stable but mediocre compromises. However, complete decomposition is not always for the best. There are situations in which completely decomposed firms are overly stable and an incomplete decomposition allows for beneficial exploration. Such situations arise when far-ranging search is coupled to some mechanism that allows the firm to latch on to the fruits of exploration.
We illustrate this possibility in the third and fourth columns of Table 2 . Firms A3 and A4 are identical to Firms A1 and A2, respectively, but have CEOs who actively review proposals from the subordinates (P = 2, ALTCEO = 3). The long-run performance of the incompletely decomposed Firm A4
is far superior to that of its completely decomposed counterpart A3. Two factors combine to produce this perhaps surprising result.
First, the proposals that flow up from subordinates to the CEO generate meaningful exploration for the incompletely decomposed firm but not for the completely decomposed firm. Since each subordinate manager must send up two proposals each period (P = 2), each is forced to make one proposal in addition to the one that he prefers. When the decision allocation internalizes all interactions (aaabbb), proposals not preferred by subordinates are subsequently rejected by the CEO; alternatives that do not appeal to the completely decomposed halves cannot benefit the whole. In contrast, when some interactions are not internalized, the proposals that the managers do not like are sometimes beneficial to the firm as a whole.
In essence, they are creative solutions that, though not preferred by the subordinate, do pry firms off of what are sticking points for the completely decomposed firm.
Second and critically, the exploration that comes from subordinates' proposals is coupled with a mechanism that provides stability: the active CEO. When active, the CEO compares combinations of subordinates' proposals to the status quo and rejects alternatives if they are worse than the status quo.
Thus, she never lets the firm move to a configuration of decisions that is worse than its current configuration. This powerfully counteracts any tendency of subordinates to wander forever, continually undermining each other. Hence with an active CEO, the incompletely decomposed firm always reaches a stable set of decisions. If-thanks to its wide exploration-an incompletely decomposed firm stumbles on an outstanding configuration of decisions, the CEO refuses to let subordinates undermine the configuration in pursuit of their departmental goals. The exploration that comes from subordinates'
proposals and the stability that comes from the CEO's oversight combine to give Firm A4 better performance than any other firm in Table 2 . Incomplete decomposition is beneficial because it contributes to exploration and is balanced by an element of organizational design that provides stability, the active CEO.
In contrast, the active CEO has no real impact on the completely decomposed Firm A3. When the decisions of the firm are completely decomposed, suggested improvements that are sent up benefit the proposing department and-because of the complete decomposition-have no effect on the other department. The CEO always accepts preferred proposals of each subordinate and, accordingly, acts much like a rubberstamper. Accordingly, the performance of Firm A3 is indistinguishable from that of Firm A1 and worse than that of Firm A4.
B. Vertical Hierarchy
The previous section may make the CEO look like an unalloyed source of benefit. She encourages subordinates to produce creative proposals, considers interactions that local managers ignore, and undertakes only those changes that are beneficial to the firm as a whole. As a result, one might expect that an active CEO should always convey an advantage to a firm. The following simulations cast a cloud on this sunny assessment of the CEO. An active CEO improves matters in most cases, but in the face of certain patterns of interactions among decisions, she can undermine short-and long-run performance.
We consider firms that face decision problems with N = 6. In contrast to the previous simulations, we do not fix a block-diagonal influence matrix. Rather, we fix the density of interactions (K) and let the computer generate the precise form of I at random. We examine all possible degrees of interaction, setting K to 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. All firms have the decision allocation aaabbb, and subordinate managers consider only one alternative at a time (ALTSUB = 1).
Firms differ in the degree of CEO activity (i.e., whether the CEO does anything more than rubberstamp proposals), the ability of the CEO to consider multiple options (ALTCEO), and the number of proposals that subordinates submit (P). Specifically, we consider the four firms described at the top of Table 3 . In Firm B1, the CEO rubberstamps proposals. In Firm B2, each manager sends up his preferred option to a CEO who considers one composite alternative. Firm B3 differs from Firm B2 in that each manager sends up two proposals. In Firm B4, each manager sends up one proposal, but the CEO can consider all new composite alternatives (i.e., as many as three alternatives) in each period. Table 3 reports the performance of each firm in period 4, averaged over 1,000 landscapes. The results for K = 0 show that an active CEO is not necessarily an advantage in the short run. Firm B1 with its rubberstamping CEO performs as well as or better than any of the firms with active CEOs. The CEO undermines performance because she is overwhelmed with proposals and becomes a bottleneck, standing between good proposals from the departments and implementation of those proposals. For instance, in Firm B2, the CEO has up to three composite alternatives to evaluate, but can assess only one composite alternative per period. Overloaded, she may ignore good proposals that are sent to her by the managers. The effect is exacerbated when the number of proposals rises (Firm B3) and mitigated when the CEO can process more options per period (Firm B4).
Short-run effects. The top panel of
As interactions across departmental boundaries proliferate, an active CEO becomes more essential.
Hence at high K, Firm B2 fares better than Firm B1 in the short run. On rugged landscapes, the benefits of a CEO who understands the interaction structure outweigh the problem of overloading the CEO. proposal is sent up enough times, at some point the CEO will consider it, accept it, and cease to be a bottleneck. This is particularly salient on a smooth landscape (i.e., K = 0). Given enough time, every firm-even one with a very limited CEO-will reach the global peak of such a landscape. In the following results, we confirm this intuition, but identify another, persistent drawback of an active CEO.
The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the performance of each firm in period 100. When K = 0, we expect and find that all firms reach the global peak in the long run. For high values of K, however, Firm B1, which has a rubberstamping CEO, performs better than Firm B2, which has an active CEO. Why is the active CEO a detriment in the long run? Firms with active CEOs never move downhill on a landscape;
the CEO vetoes such a maneuver. As a result, these firms move toward sticking points and rapidly get locked into a choice configuration before a wide range of alternatives is considered. In contrast, rubberstamping CEOs will sometimes approve proposals that, though in the interest of departmental managers, cause overall performance to decline temporarily. This promotes wider exploration of possibilities and, in the long run, higher performance. The final two rows of Table 3 support this interpretation for the case of K = 5. Firm B2 perceives far more sticking points than Firm B1 and is much more likely to get stuck with a poor compromise among the subordinates and the CEO. In sum, Firm B2 has more stability and undertakes less exploration than is optimal when interactions are pervasive.
Employing a smarter CEO, as Firm B4 does, does not alleviate the long-run problem that an active CEO causes when K is high; the ability to assess more alternatives does not help if too few alternatives are being proposed. On the other hand, it is helpful to insist on a greater flow of information from subordinates to the CEO, as Firm B3 does. With larger numbers of proposals coming in, the danger of premature lock-in diminishes and the benefits of an active CEO-especially her ability to keep subordinates from acting in ways that undermine overall performance-reassert themselves. The exploration promoted by higher P productively balances the stability provided by the CEO.
In sum, the active CEO has quite different drawbacks in the short run and the long run. In the short run, the CEO can pose a bottleneck. This is particularly problematic when interactions are sparse. The problem is exacerbated by a greater flow of information and alleviated by hiring a smarter CEO. In the long run, the active CEO can funnel a firm prematurely to a mediocre sticking point. This is a risk especially when interactions are pervasive. The problem is alleviated by a greater flow of information, which induces greater exploration, but not by an increase in the CEO's processing power.
Together, these results are suggestive of very different vertical hierarchies suitable for volatile and stable environments. In volatile settings, firms essentially face a series of short-run problems. Attaining decent results quickly (e.g., by period 4) requires either a passive CEO who lets subordinates make final choices (when K is low) or a very smart CEO who acts on the basis of limited information (when K is high). In stable settings, firms can focus on long-run (e.g., period-100) performance, which is best delivered by an active, not-necessarily-brilliant CEO who receives and reviews numerous proposals. This conclusion is reminiscent of Burns and Stalker's (1961) findings on organic and mechanistic organizations and Brown and Eisenhardt's (1997) observations of successful organizational structures in highly dynamic environments. This speculative interpretation deserves further research.
C. Firm-level Incentives
In all previous simulations, subordinates cared only about the payoffs of their own departments (INCENT = 0). The qualitative literature on organizational design suggests that it is wise to reward managers at least partly on the basis of company-wide performance. Firm-level incentives encourage managers to consider the consequences of their actions beyond departmental borders. In this subsection, we largely confirm the qualitative literature, but find that it applies most strongly in the face of certain patterns of interaction and decomposition and over certain time horizons.
To focus on the effect of INCENT, we first consider a set of simulations with N = 6 and varying levels of K. Decision allocations are aaabbb, CEOs rubberstamp proposals, and each subordinate considers one alternative per period. Firms differ only in their value of INCENT, which ranges from 0 to 1. however, an increase in INCENT leads to higher performance; when decisions interact, firm-level incentives are beneficial. Moreover, the greater is the degree of interaction, the larger are the marginal benefits of firm-level incentives. Firm-level incentives boost short-run performance largely because they discourage each subordinate from undertaking locally beneficial moves that undermine improvement efforts in the other department.
Firm-level incentives are beneficial in the short run, but they have a potential drawback in the long run. While discouraging managers from taking actions that undermine other departments and thereby stabilizing choices, firm-level incentives also limit the degree to which managers explore the space of possibilities. Especially when the performance landscape is rugged with lots of local peaks, one fears that firm-level incentives could herd firms prematurely toward mediocre outcomes. Figure 3 , which shows results in period 100, illustrates this effect. As before, broad incentives have no effect when interactions are absent (K = 0) and a positive effect when interactions are present but modest (K = 1, 2, or 3). When landscapes are very rugged (K = 5), however, long-run performance is insensitive to INCENT. Firms with high INCENT get off to a faster start because managers are not undermining each other's improvement efforts (Figure 2 ). But because they continue to explore and improve for longer, firms with low INCENT ultimately match the performance of firms with high INCENT (Figure 3) . Table 4 confirms this interpretation: firms with low INCENT wander for longer than their high-INCENT counterparts, and for high K, encounter higher heights along their search paths, though they may be unable to hold onto these heights. For instance, Firm C1, with INCENT = 0, typically reaches a maximum performance of 0.915 during its search of K = 5 landscapes, but its long-term performance in period 100 is only 0.883. In contrast, for Firm C6, with INCENT = 1, maximum performance along the search path on K = 5 landscapes equals its long-term performance of 0.885. Figure 3 suggests that the optimal balance between exploration and stability depends on the underlying pattern of interactions. When interactions are pervasive and corresponding landscapes are rugged, the exploration that comes from, say, narrow incentives may be as important as the stability that firm-level incentives could provide.
D. Managerial Ability
In all of the analyses so far, we have assumed that subordinate managers have very limited processing power: they can consider only one local alternative set of decisions each period. If a firm faces interdependent decisions, a natural response is to hire more capable managers who can consider multiple options and, in particular, can anticipate the effects of changing multiple decisions at once. Though natural, the response is not always productive. In this subsection, we show that "smarter" managers may undermine performance when decomposition is incomplete. Moreover, firm-level incentives may exacerbate the marginal harm caused by more capable subordinates.
Consider a situation like that described in Section 4.A: N = 6, the influence matrix is block-diagonal, and the CEO rubberstamps subordinates' recommendations. Table 5 shows how an increase in subordinates' processing power, ALTSUB, affects the performance of completely decomposed firms (aaabbb) and incompletely decomposed firms (aabbba). The results for the completely decomposed Firms D1-3 show the pattern one might expect: smarter managers produce better results. Indeed, a subordinate with ALTSUB = 7 can consider all of the alternatives available within his department and immediately leap to the global optimum. The situation is markedly different for Firms D4-6, in which interactions span department borders. Among incompletely decomposed firms, the ones with the most capable managers tend to do the worst in the long run.
Why do smarter managers undermine the long-run performance of incompletely decomposed firms?
The answer lies in the problem that smart subordinates create for each other when their domains influence one another. A smart subordinate searches broadly and undertakes far-reaching changes to improve the performance of his department. In doing so, however, he undermines the improvement efforts that the other, equally smart subordinate is making. Hence a pair of smart subordinates can dance about forevereach making radical moves that seem like uphill movements from his own perspective but that deform the landscape as the other sees it. The bottom line of Table 5 , showing the portion of firms that still wander after period 80, reflects this on-going dance. Such a problem does not arise when the allocation of decisions eliminates interactions between departments and completely decomposes the decision problem.
For firms D1-D3, the changes implemented by one manager do not affect the situation facing the other, and smarter is indeed better.
The simulation in Table 5 can be interpreted in terms of the balance between exploration and stability.
As discussed above, thorough decomposition leads to stability whereas cross-department interactions contribute to exploration. The more alternatives a manager is able to consider, the wider the domain he explores. When smart managers are coupled with a decision allocation that decomposes the firm completely, exploration and stability are balanced and performance is good. With capable managers and incomplete decomposition, a firm roams the landscape widely and achieves only mediocre performance.
Firm-level incentives further amplify the harmful effects of smarter managers. Firms D7-9 are organizations with incomplete decomposition and subordinates who pursue firm-level performance.
Comparing the long-run performance levels of Firms D7-9 to those of Firms D4-6, we see that firm-level incentives increase the marginal harm done by more capable managers. Specifically, an increase from ALTSUB = 1 to ALTSUB = 7 causes performance to decline by 0.031 when INCENT = 0 and by 0.084 when INCENT = 1. This occurs because, as shown in the last line of Table 5 , high-level incentives stabilize subordinates with ALTSUB = 1, but not subordinates with ALTSUB = 7.
Discussion
To succeed, an organization must not only explore its environment widely enough to discover good sets of coordinated choices, but must also stabilize around those sets once they are discovered. This duality has played a central role in substantial prior research-on the productivity dilemma (Abernathy 1978) , static and dynamic efficiency (Ghemawat and Ricart i Costa 1993) , exploration and exploitation (March 1991) , and the ambidextrous organization (Tushman and O'Reilly 1996) , for instance. We build on these precedents in three ways.
First, in the context of a formal model of search, we associate exploration and stability with specific coordinating mechanisms. Decomposition, or the grouping of related decisions under an individual manager, gives each manager a stable situation in which to pursue departmental improvement, but it does not encourage subordinates to consider a wide array of alternatives. Likewise, an active CEO who rejects proposals that make the firm as a whole worse off serves as a source of stability but can curtail useful exploration. A second element of the vertical hierarchy, the number of proposals sent up to the CEO, can, however, foster exploration. When this number is high, subordinates are forced to submit ideas that are not their most preferred ones, perhaps to the benefit of the organization. Firm-level incentives discourage subordinates from proposing actions that are locally beneficial but globally detrimental. In doing so, they push the firm toward stability, especially if the firm has low-ability managers. Finally, the hiring of managers who can process many alternatives leads to broader exploration. Examination of behavior in landscape terms and analyses of firms' sticking points proved useful in looking at the effect of the coordinating mechanisms on exploration and stability.
Our second contribution is to emphasize the need for an organization to strike a balance between exploration and stability. While much of the prior literature highlights the tension between the two, we focus on the ways in which they can work together. We find, for instance, that it can be useful to couple interdependencies among departments with an active CEO (Section 4.A); an active CEO with a rich vertical flow of information (4.B); and smart subordinates with thorough decomposition (4.D). We illustrate many interdependencies among the elements of organizational structure (a unique strength of our modeling approach). All can be conceived of in terms of a balance between exploration and stability.
Third, we show how the underlying pattern of interaction affects the appropriate balance between exploration and stability. The greater is the degree of interaction among decisions, the more rugged are the landscapes that firms face. This ruggedness provides a built-in element of stability. A firm can productively counter this stability by shifting its organizational arrangements in favor of exploration.
Hence, we see a need for a rubberstamping CEO or a rich vertical flow of information when interactions are pervasive (4.B). Similarly, when K is high, we see no long-run benefit associated with firm-level incentives that stabilize choices (4.C).
Our results offer a number of empirical propositions. We feel most confident in hypotheses that match the three contributions we just identified: Interpreted literally, our simulation results also suggest a number of hypotheses that are more finegrained. The analysis in Section 4.A, for instance, suggests that a firm with interdependencies across departments and an active CEO will perform better than a completely decomposed one with a passive CEO. We prefer to focus on the three higher-level hypotheses rather than on such fine-grained propositions. As mentioned at the beginning of Section 4, our goal has been to identify broad patterns of relationships among coordinating mechanisms, not to claim that particular, fine-grained results are robust.
Our work joins a growing set of papers that use agent-based computer simulations and, more generally, tools from research on complex adaptive systems to explore the concerns of management (e.g., Kauffman 1995; Carley and Svoboda 1996; Carley and Lin 1997; Levinthal 1997; Anderson, et al. 1999; Axelrod and Cohen. 1999; Kauffman, Lobo, and Macready 2000) . We hope that our work illustrates the utility of such tools. They can be employed to examine issues that are difficult to tackle with conventional modeling techniques, in particular issues concerning interaction and interdependencies. At the same time, researchers must modify these tools substantially as they import them from other fields.
We use Kauffman's (1993) NK model, devised in the context of evolutionary biology, to generate the decision problems that our simulated firms face, but the firms themselves bear little resemblance to Kauffman's biological entities. Rather, they have internal arrangements that are motivated by the rich literature on organizational design. The impact of this modification is fundamental. For instance, a basic property of biological entities in landscape models is that they tend toward local peaks-i.e., sets of choices that permit no beneficial incremental adaptation. Once we allow modeled entities to include multiple decision makers, we find that they migrate toward sticking points that may well not be local peaks on the performance landscape. Moreover, with an active CEO, firms can get stuck in situations in which both subordinates wish to make an incremental change yet cannot. Thus, organizational sticking points might not even be local peaks on managers' "subscapes," their lower-dimensional landscapes whose dimensions incorporate the decisions under their respective purview. The general lesson, we believe, is that models of complex adaptive systems developed in biological or physical contexts can be highly useful in management science, but must be tailored with care to fit a managerial context. We see multiple avenues for future research, three of which we highlight here. First, the firms we have simulated are endowed with organizational structures that they cannot change. In reality, of course, firms can and often do alter their organizational arrangements. If allowed to tweak their internal structures, do firms gravitate toward effective organizational designs? Or is the landscape in the space of possible designs itself rugged, raising the prospect that firms will get stuck on low local optima? Second, our modeled managers perceive performance levels correctly and do not make unintended moves. In reality, mistakes and misperceptions are common, especially in settings rich with interactions among decisions, and such miscues might have profound effects (Siggelkow 2000) . What kinds of organizational designs are robust to errors like these? Finally, as noted above, we have omitted from our model any notion of environmental change. Simulated firms face a fixed and constant landscape. A distinguished line of research emphasizes that organizations design themselves in part to cope with environmental change (Burns and Stalker 1961; Chandler 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967 
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A check mark indicates a finding or relationship discussed in the text. In the full results available from the authors, we identify interdependencies involving all pairs of the four coordinating mechanisms. 
